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Stealey: Attorney and Client--Contingent Fee

STUDENT NOTES
munity? On this question, the courts have not been able to agree.
For example, some courts hold valid conditions against alienation
to Negroes as reasonable restrictions which the grantor may place
on the property. Queensborough Land Co. v. (Jazeaux, 136 La.
724, 67 So. 641 (1915); Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205
S. W. 217 (1918) ; Torrey et al. v. Wolfes et al., 6 F. (2nd) 702
(D. C. 1925); and in Russell et al., v. Wallace et al., 30 F. (2d.)
981 (D. C. 1929), it was held that a contract between property
owners forbidding sale to Negroes, or persons of any race other
than the white or Caucasian race, -was valid. Other courts, however, had held invalid such conditions, basing their decisions on
the ground that such conditions tend to prevent free alienation
of real property and are therefore undesirable. Title Guarantee
and Trust Company v. Garrott, 42 Cal. App. 152, 183 Pac. 470
(1919); Los Angeles Rv. Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac.
596 (1920).
It is to be noted that in the principal case the court only passed
on the question of restraint on alienation and left open the question of the validity of restraints as to occupancy.
On the question of restraints as to occupancy most courts hold
valid such restrictions. Parmalee et al. v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625,
188 N. W. 330 (1922); Wayt et al. v. Patee et al., 269 Pac. 660
(Cal. 1928). Some of the courts which hold invalid restraints
as to alienation, hold restraints as to occupancy valid.
What our court would have held if presented with a question
as to occupancy is a matter of conjecture, but it is submitted as
the opinion of the writer that it would, as other courts have done,
segregate title and occupancy.
-CAR.L A. McComa.s.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-CONTINGENT FEs.-The syllabus of
Clayton v. Martin, 151 S. E. 855 (W. Va. 1930) reaffirms the
rule originally laid down in Polsey v. Anderson, 7 W. Va. 202
(1874) that the amount to be recovered in an action on a contingent fee where the contract was broken by the client is to be
measured by a quantum meruit only. Between these dates have
come several cases concerning contingent fees, none of which, however, directly hold on the question as to the measure of recovery.
Tomlinson v. Polsey, 31 W. Va. 108, 5 S. E. 457, was a suit between attorneys, formerly partners, as to the proceeds of a successfully prosecuted suit on a contingent fee after one of them had
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been dismissed and paid by the client. In Fisher v. Mylius, 42
W. Va. 638, 26 S. E. 309, the stipulation was for a percentage
of the damages recovered and it was held the attorney could get
nothing until the judgment was paid. ,And where the stipulation
was for five per cent in excess of a certain amount the contract
is good. Camden v. McCoy, 48 W. Va. 377, 37 S. E. 637. Likewise the attorney must take no unfair advantage of the client in
making such a contract. Dorr v. Camden, 55 W Va. 226, 46
S. E. 1014.
The dicta in these cases confirm the rule in Polsey v. Anderson,
supra. In Clayton v. Martin, supra, only the praecipe had been
filed and the client upon being informed that the attorney had
brought a wrong action sought to dismiss him and compromise
the fee, which offer was refused. While the report of Polsey v.
Anderson, supra, does not disclose to what stage the suit had
proceeded yet it is distinctly alleged that the client had prevented
the successful prosecution of it. In discussing the measure of
recovery the opinion says: "That whether the engagement was
broken through inability or design, the amount of remuneration
is the same."
Although the facts of the latest case are not as strong as those
of the first holding on the question the problem is raised as to
whether under any circumstances more than a quantum meruit
might be recovered. Where the client compromises the suit the
attorney may recover the same percentage of the recovery as if
the suit had been fully prosecuted. 3 A. i. R. 473, and cases
cited. The rule in the West Virginia cases is not universal. In
some jurisdictions when the client prevents the successful prosecution of the suit the attorney may recover the full amount provided by the contract in event of success. Brodie v. Watkins,
33 Ark. 545; Hill v. Cunningham, 25 Texas 25, 6 C. J. 724, 2
R. C. L. 1048, 3 A. L. R. 491. Likewise in brokerage transactions
for the sale of real estate, although the vendor has the right to
revoke the agency, yet he may not do so to avoid payment of
commissions and in such case the broker may recover the full
amount. Peters v. Riley, 73 W. Va. 785, 81 S. E. 530, 9 C. J.
563. In dealings between attorney and client, if the attorney witharaws without cause he may recover nothing. Matheny v. Parley,
66 W. Va. 680, 66 S. B. 1060.
In view of the disadvantage in which the rule reaffirmed in
Clayton v. Martin, supra, may put the attorney, and in addition
the practical difficulty of proving the worth of the services on
a quantum meruit for which Clayton v. Martin was reversed, it
seems that under the circumstances set out above the attorney
should be allowed a larger measure for the damages springing
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from the wrongful act of the client. But under the quantum
meruit rule, why should not the contingent fee be taken into
consideration in finding the value of the services? In Pratt v.
Kerns, 123 Ill. App. 86, it was held that the entire contingent
fee might be recovered if the services were worth that much.
-ROBIT

E. SmALEY.

TORTs-CoNTRmuTony NEGLIGENCE Or Aw AUTOMOBILE PASSEN-

GER.-The son of the deceased drove an automobile onto a railroad crossing at a low rate of speed, and due to the fact that
the boards along the tracks were not as wide as the highway, the
right front wheel of the car dropped over the first rail beyond
the ends of the boards and the car was stalled. The deceased was
sitting on the front seat. While unable to move, the car was hit
by a fast moving train and the father and two other passengers
were killed, the driver escaping by jumping. It was mid-day.
Held, an automobile passenger must use such reasonable care for
his own safety as an ordinarily prudent person would exercise;
and a passenger failing to warn the driver that the boards between
the railroad tracks did not extend the full width of the highway,
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Waller v. Norfolk & Western Railway Company, 152 S. E. 13 (W. Va. 1930).
In previous cases the court has said that the negligence of the
driver cannot be imputed to a passenger. It is also said that the
passenger must use such care for his own safety as an ordinarily
prudent person would exercise in like circumstances. Young v.
Railroad Company, 96 W. Va. 534, 123 S. E. 433; Jameson v.
Railway Company, 97 W. Va. 119,. 124 S. E. 491; Pierce v. Railroad Company, 99 W. Va. 313, 128 S. E. 832; 18 A. L. R., note
p. 309, and cases there cited and reviewed.
It has been said by our court that the duty of the passenger
is less than that of the driver. Young v. Railroad Company, supra,
at p. 537. How much less, one is not able to determine.
As to whether the question of contributory negligence of an
automobile driver is a matter for the jury or a matter for the
court seems to depend upon the facts in each particular case.
"Where the facts which control are not disputed and are such
that reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion from them,
the question of contributory negligence barring recovery is one
of law for the court." Krodel v, B. & 0. R. R. Company, 99 W.
Va. 374, 128 S. E. 824.
Four cases have been decided by our court which involved the
contributory negligence of a passenger in a car hit by a railroad
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